Security

Use this page when a Swift reader accepts bytes from outside the application's trust boundary. Fory reconstructs application values; it does not authenticate the sender, protect transport integrity, or decide whether a valid value is authorized for a business operation.

Application boundary

Before deserialization:

• Authenticate the sender and protect message integrity at the transport or storage layer.
• Enforce request or file size, timeout, and concurrency limits outside Fory.
• Register only the application types the endpoint accepts and configure the reader before its first root operation.
• Validate the deserialized value against application authorization and domain rules before use.

Built-in safeguards

Security-related configuration:

• Register only the expected generated models before deserializing untrusted payloads.
• Use checkClassVersion with compatible: false for intentional same-schema payloads.
• Set maxDepth for the largest nested user-value graph your service accepts. Static recursive values, dynamic Any values, and compatible field skipping share the same root budget.
• Set maxGraphMemoryBytes as an approximate gate for collection, map, array, struct, class, and object-heavy payloads. It is not an exact heap cap; leaf values are gated by remaining input bytes.
• Keep remote metadata size limits at their defaults unless a trusted peer needs larger metadata. Schema-version limits bound caching; additional valid schemas are decoded without caching.

Verification

Add negative tests for the boundary as well as normal round trips. Verify that the configured reader rejects unexpected application types, excessive nesting, resource-limit violations, and malformed input. After a failed read, verify that a valid root can still be read with the same Fory instance.

See Configuration for the complete option reference and Type Registration for the Fory registration API.